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Abstract
The promotion of female autonomy is both intrinsically and instrumentally desir-
able. We document differences in the distribution of female autonomy in India (using
the National Family Health Survey 2005-6) addressing two methodological challenges:
the multidimensional nature of the concept and its frequent measurement with ordinal
discrete variables (which are not amenable to direct comparisons of social averages). We
tackle these challenges with three methods based on stochastic dominance techniques
suited for ordinal and dichotomous variables. Whenever these dominance conditions
hold for a pairwise comparison, we can conclude that the multidimensional autonomy
distribution in one state is more desirable than in another one across a broad range
of criteria for the individual and social welfare evaluation of autonomy. Consistently
across the three methods, we find that most of the states with better autonomy distribu-
tions (in pairwise comparisons) come from the North East and the South, whereas most
of the states with worse autonomy distributions come from the North.
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1 Introduction
Autonomy has traditionally been defined as "the capacity of rational individuals to make
an informed, un-coerced decision". Amongmany conceptual implications, autonomy evokes
the ability to influence one’s fate and surroundings. This involves a positive aspect ("power
to") and a negative aspect ("power over"). Likewise autonomy, and its related notion of
agency, can be either passive (when there is little choice) or active (reflecting purposeful
behaviour) (Kabeer, 2005). Whichever the form, autonomy is a necessarily multifaceted
phenomenon (Narayan, 2005): autonomy over one’s health, over one’s personal relation-
ships, and so forth. Now, given the existence of different forms of discrimination against
women in many societies, the enhancement of female autonomy is intrinsically worth pur-
suing. Moreover, the literature has put forward many additional instrumental reasons for
fostering female autonomy. For instance, female autonomy is causally associated with the
ability to benefit from business training for entrepreneurs (Field et al., 2010), it increases
the chances of using contraceptives (Moursund and Kravdal, 2003), and it has been found
to improve prenatal care, delivery and postnatal care (Mistry et al., 2009). More recently,
Duflo (2012) summarized the evidence pointing to a positive correlation between female
autonomy and economic development: Higher gender equality can lead to improvements
in health and quality of life for women and their family members. Women with greater
agency are more likely to have fewer children, more likely to access health services and
have control over health and education resources, and less likely to suffer domestic vio-
lence.
There is a long and old literature on female autonomy in India and other major south
and eastern Asian nations, including the classic study of Dyson and Moore (1983). The
main themes are usually the measurement of the extent of female autonomy itself, the
identification of autonomy’s determinants, its consequences (i.e. its instrumental impor-
tance), and recently there has also been an interest in the perception mismatch between
husbands and wives when it comes to ascertaining the degree of the wife’s autonomy. This
literature has found recurrent correlates of female autonomy in south Asian countries,
including: kinship systems (posited by Dyson and Moore, 1983), women’s earnings and
family income (Anderson and Eswaran, 2009), dowry and goods owned (Jejeebhoy and
Sathar, 2001), wife and husband education (Anderson and Eswaran, 2009; Jejeebhoy and
Sathar, 2001), co-residing mother-in-law (Anderson and Eswaran, 2009; Jejeebhoy and
Sathar, 2001), religion and region (Jejeebhoy and Sathar, 2001).
Three factors could plausibly explain the dynamic nature of female autonomy, and
gender inequality in general, in India: (a) Sanskritisation (Srinivas, 1956), (b) economic
development, and (c) cultural representations of gender (Chatterjee, 1989). ‘Sanskritisa-
tion’ is a process through which lower castes try to imitate the upper castes’ customs in
order to attain higher social status.1 In this process, lower castes show higher devotion
to the classical ‘Sanskrit’ way of living. Sanskritisation can be harmful for female auton-
omy as it promotes a patrilineal structure, patriarchal power relations, virilocality, son
preference, low priority to female education and health, social and physical immobility
of women, immurement of women from the external world and total economic and social
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dependence of women on men.2 Economic development can exert a mixed impact. For
instance, the positive impact can come from increased female education. However, there
might be a backlash effect, leading to dampening of freedom of movement and participa-
tion in decision-making, if husbands react negatively to increased female education, either
out of jealousy of improved female education and earning prospects, or out of concern for
the prospects of women mingling more freely with other men. According to (Chatterjee,
1989), projecting Indian women as modest, moral, and humble is used to show the supe-
riority of Indian culture against the Western counterpart and this may lead to creation of
subjugated Indian women even today. This argument has been reiterated by (Abraham,
2001) and (Derne, 2003).
This paper’s purpose is to compare the levels and distribution of female autonomy
across Indian states with a proposal to address two methodological challenges: the multi-
dimensional nature of female autonomy (Narayan, 2005), and the fact that its indicators
are usually ordinal or dichotomous variables. Our proposal looks into the different ways
in which the wellbeing provided by a set of dichotomous autonomy indicators can be eval-
uated relying on individual and social welfare functions. These functions reflect mech-
anisms to aggregate the set of variables at the individual and social level, respectively.
Without being exhaustive, we propose three general methods to measure individual and
social welfare derived from female autonomy, each of which encompasses a wide array of
possible composite indices based on the set of indicators. For each method we discuss the
underlying welfare measurement assumptions and properties, i.e. the meaning of measur-
ing multidimensional autonomy; while also clarifying their limitations.
Our three methods work with stochastic dominance techniques for ordinal and dichoto-
mous variables in order to document whether autonomy comparisons across Indian states
are robust to broad classes of individual welfare functions (each, embedding large varieties
of composite indices). When the dominance conditions hold, the ensuing robust ordering
(i.e. comparison) has an interpretation in terms of preference over lotteries based on these
individual welfare ("utility") functions. Moreover, if our purpose is to rank Indian states in
terms of the relative desirability of their autonomy distributions, then when the conditions
hold, we do not need to choose, and justify the choice, among several potentially suitable
composite indices. More specifically, our second and third methods relate to the counting
approach (Townsend, 1979) now popular in the measurement of multidimensional poverty
(e.g. in the UNDP’s "Multidimensional Poverty Index", see (Alkire and Santos, 2014)), but
also being used in different areas of social science, including female autonomy itself (e.g.
Alkire et al., 2013).
Our empirical analysis is based on India’s National Family Health Survey 2005-6,
which has questions on female autonomy over decisions involving small and large house-
hold purchases, family visits, health, and command over husband’s money. We compare
the multivariate distributions of female autonomy across Indian states, and we find that
Southern (i.e. Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh or Karnataka) and North-Eastern
states (i.e. those beyond the Siliguri corridor plus Sikkim) tend to dominate Northern
States. Accordingly, the main "dominators" (i.e. states that more frequently turn up with
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better autonomy distributions vis-a-vis other states) tend to come from the North East,
whereas the main "dominated" states are from the North. Remarkably, our results are
fairly consistent across the three methods.
Although our results corroborate previous evidence that "less sanscritized" states fare
better than "sanscritized" ones in terms of female autonomy; we do find several exceptions
in state-to-state comparisons. So it is not always the case that any random southern state
or "chicken-neck" state will dominate a northern state. Among comparisons of "less san-
scritized" states, there are also interesting results: generally (although with exceptions)
most "chicken-neck" states dominate southern states.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The next section describes the three meth-
ods proposed for robust comparisons of multidimensional autonomy with dichotomized
variables. Then the Data section describes the autonomy questions available, as well as
alternative dichotomization options. This is followed by a section discussing our results
for the three methods and for alternative dichotomization choices. Finally, the paper con-
cludes with some remarks.
2 Methodology: Female autonomy comparisons across pop-
ulations from a welfare-function perspective
How can we perform basic comparisons of female autonomy when we have several ordi-
nal or dichotomous indicators? One possibility is to report results using only probability
distributions. This is, for instance, the path followed by the Indian Government’s "Gender
equality and women’s empowerment in India" report. They report a dashboard of these
distributions, i.e. for each autonomy indicator separately, although in theory they could
also report multivariate distributions. However, with three or more indicators this task
can become cumbersome and the results may be difficult to read and understand. Besides,
a dashboard approach to multivariate phenomena bears the limitation of dismissing the
information embedded in the joint distribution of indicators across a sample or population
(Alkire et al., 2015).
Another well-known method, which is sensitive to the joint distribution of indicators,
is the construction of scores based on dichotomized variables. This can be performed in
different ways, and there are plenty of examples for this approach (e.g. Oppenheim, 2005).
For instance, if the variables measure the dichotomous access to services, then the score
could provide a composite index of aggregate access such that the more services for which
there is access, the higher the value of the score. If one uses exogenous weights to construct
the score (e.g. assigned by the researcher or through participatory methods) then a count-
ing approach is being used (e.g. as in part of the procedure implemented by Alkire et al.
(2013)). Alternatively the score can also be constructed using multiple correspondence
analysis (as in the proposal of Asselin and Anh (2008)) or other latent variable models, in
which case the weights are endogenous and determined by the dataset (Alkire et al., 2015).
This approach bears important advantages, e.g. being able to order completely populations
e.g. by average value of the score or composite index. However the welfare interpretation,
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implications and limitations of any particular choice for the construction of scores is rarely
discussed in the autonomy literature.
Finally, as will be discussed and proposed in this section, with stochastic dominance
conditions we can test whether multidimensional autonomy comparisons would be robust
to a broad set of specific welfare measurement criteria. If we find that the multivariate
autonomy distribution of society "A" dominates that of "B" according to some specific con-
dition, then we could also interpret that people who value autonomy according to some
defined welfare criteria would rather live in "A" and face its "autonomy lottery", if "auton-
omy" were the only realm they cared about and they could not know a priori which degree
of autonomy they would enjoy in whichever society they lived (i.e. a sort of Rawlsian "veil
of ignorance").
In order to introduce our proposal, imagine a survey with questions on D dimensions
of female autonomy (e.g. health care, household purchases, family visits, etc.). In the case
of India’s National Family Health Survey (2005-6) an autonomy question, e.g. on final say
over decisions regarding the wife’s health, has the following three answer categories: wife
decides alone, husband and wife decide jointly, husband decides alone on behalf of both.
With these responses we construct a dichotomous variable for dimension d, Ad, such that
Ad = 1 only if the wife has a say in the decision (i.e. either decides alone, or jointly with the
husband). Otherwise, if the decision is made by the husband on behalf of the wife then:
Ad = 0. While it is uncontroversial to state that, from an autonomy perspective, a woman’s
exclusion from a decision affecting her life is worse than not being excluded, we do not find
compelling reasons to assert that, in every circumstance, a woman deciding alone is more
autonomous than one deciding jointly with her husband. Hence we merge the two latter
categories.
However, in some cases like autonomy on health decisions, one could justify attribut-
ing higher value of a woman’s alone decision over a joint decision; relying, for instance,
on the notion of bodily integrity which involves reproduction choices (Nussbaum, 2000).
On the other hand, in relatively well-working marriages, one could also argue that joint
marital decisions on the wife’s health, based on respectful dialogue, should not be placed
beneath the option of a wife’s lone decision. Since we find both arguments appealing, we
dichotomize the health autonomy variable under both criteria (and pursue the analysis
using both options, although only reporting fully one set of results since they do not differ
significantly), i.e. once setting Ad = 1 only if the wife has a say in the decision, and once
setting Ad = 1 only if the wife has the sole say in the decision.
The next step is to propose an individual welfare evaluation function: U(A1,A2, ...,AD) ∶
{0,1}D →R+. We want the welfare function to satisfy at least the following property:
Axiom 1. Monotonicity: U(Ad = 1) > U(Ad = 0) for any d, ceteris paribus.
Axiom 1 states that a woman draws more satisfaction from having autonomy over any
given dimension than from not having it. If the variables were continuous we would say
that all the first partial derivatives are positive. In some cases, we could also consider the
following property:
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Axiom 2. Weak complementarity: All the first-order cross-partial differences of U are non-
negative.3
Weak complementarity states that acquiring autonomy over other dimensions does not
diminish the welfare impact of acquiring autonomy over any given dimension. If the vari-
ables were continuous, we would say that all the first-order cross-partial derivatives are
either positive or zero. The rationale of weak complementarity lies in the difficulty of con-
sidering or finding situations in which enjoying autonomy over an extra dimension of life
would diminish the increase in welfare satisfaction from acquiring autonomy in another
dimension, in every possible combination of dimensions simultaneously. If the welfare
function satisfies axiom 2 then we say that any pair of variables exhibits a weak form
of ALEP complementarity (Kannai, 1980). In one of our autonomy comparison methods
proposed below, we will allow for a relaxation of weak complementarity as well.
Our social comparisons are then based on social welfare evaluation functions which ag-
gregate the individual welfare function. We focus on the simplest and most popular social
welfare function which is, basically, additively separable in the individual utility func-
tions, and symmetric across individuals. For comparability purposes we impose a popula-
tion principle property on the social welfare function, whereby a cloning of each individual
by the same factor (e.g. a duplication) renders social welfare unchanged. This property
requires considering social welfare as an average across individual welfare functions:
W ≡
1
N
N
∑
i=1
U(Ai1,Ai2, ...,AiD) (1)
where N is the population size and the variables have now a subscript i to denote in-
dividual i. We are interested then in comparisons of the form ∆W ≡ WS −W T , where S
and T are two populations, e.g. two countries. The question is: How can we perform these
autonomy comparisons relying on multiple dichotomous variables? There are a few op-
tions. Without exhausting all of them, in this paper we propose and apply three methods,
all derived from variations of the same welfare measurement framework.
2.1 First method: a first-order stochastic dominance condition for mul-
tiple dichotomous variables
Let PS be a 2
D-dimensional vector representing the joint discrete probability distribution
of autonomy dichotomous variables in society S, i.e.: P ∶ [p(0,0, ...,0), p(1,0, ...,0), ..., p(1,1, ...,1)],
where, for instance,: p(0,0, ...,0) ≡ Pr[A1 = 0,A2 = 0,AD = 0]. Likewise the cumulative
distribution is worth defining: F ∶ [F (0,0, ...,0), F (1,0,0, ...0), ..., F (1,1, ...,1)], where, for
instance: F (1,0,0, ...,0) ≡ Pr[A1 ⩽ 1,A2 = 0,AD = 0], and of course F (1,1, ...,1) = 1. Finally,
we define the survival function: F ∶ [F (0,0, ...,0), F (1,0,0, ...0), ..., F (1,1, ...,1)], where, for
instance: F (1,0,0, ...,0) ≡ Pr[A1 = 1,A2 ⩾ 0,AD ⩾ 0], and of course F (0,0, ...,0) = 1.
If we want autonomy comparisons to be consistent with the properties of monotonicity,
weak complementarity, additive separability and population principle, but do not want to
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choose any particular functional form for U , we can test the following first-order dominance
condition:
Condition 1. First-order stochastic dominance: ∆W > 0 ∀W satisfying population prin-
ciple, symmetry, and additive separability, and ∀U satisfying monotonicity and weak com-
plementarity if and only if ∆F (i1, i2, ..., iD) ⩾ 0 ∀i1, i2, ..., iD = 0,1 with at least one strict
inequality.
Proof. See Appendix. ∎
Condition 1 states that expected welfare from autonomy in S is higher than in T , for
any individual welfare function satisfying monotonicity and weak complementarity, if and
only if the total joint survival distribution of the autonomy variables in S is never below
that in B, and is strictly above for some combination of values of the autonomy variables.
Therefore, when the condition holds for a pair of Indian states, an autonomy comparison is
robust to any (potentially arbitrary) choice of individual welfare functions satisfying mono-
tonicity and weak complementarity. If condition 1 holds, then we say that S dominates T
in first order, denoted by S ≻1 T .4
The fulfillment of the condition can also be given the following interpretation: If W is
considered an expected level of satisfaction from autonomy (or of "overall" autonomy itself),
then it could be considered a type of lottery, in which each level of autonomy welfare comes
along with a probability of occurrence attached to it. Hypothetically if a woman could
choose in which state to be born among two compared options (e.g. S and T ), a situation
of S ≻1 T , should lead the woman to choose S, even though she does not know exactly
which realized level of autonomy she may actually enjoy in state S. However, given this
"veil of ignorance", state S offers a more appealing "lottery". Note that in many situations
dominance cannot be established, i.e. when the survival distribution functions "cross"
(∆F (i1, i2, ..., iD) ⩾ 0 for some i1, i2, ..., iD but otherwise ∆F (i1, i2, ..., iD) ⩽ 0). This is why
dominance conditions are set to provide, normally, partial or incomplete rankings, also
known as pre-(or quasi) orderings.
In order to test for the presence of first-order stochastic dominance in pairwise compar-
isons, we need to ascertain whether ∆F (i1, i2, ..., iD) ⩾ 0 ∀i1, i2, ..., iD = 0,1 (with at least
one strict inequality) holds. For that purpose we can use the test proposed by Yalonet-
zky (2013). In practice, a test of condition 1 may be too demanding computationally, and
in terms of sample size requirements, if D is too large. In our Indian dataset we have
5 autonomy variables in dichotomous form. Therefore the joint discrete survival distri-
bution vector contains 32 probabilities, yielding 31 comparison points. 5 Therefore, even
though the test is not difficult to implement in our case (especially given the relatively
large sample sizes we have), it could become unwieldy should D be greater.
An interesting aspect of stochastic dominance conditions is a trade-off between the
stringency of the distributional condition (e.g. on joint survival functions) and the breadth
of the class of welfare functions for which the condition applies. The more stringent the
distributional condition the broader the class of welfare functions for which a comparison
will be robust. For instance, condition 1 is quite stringent, especially when D is large: in
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order for it to hold, two joint survival functions mapping from a multivariate domain must
not cross. But the pay-off is also large: if the condition holds, then "A" dominates "B" for a
broad class of welfare functions.
The next method re-balances the trade-off in favour of a less stringent distributional
condition, but at the cost of being relevant for a narrower, albeit still informative, class of
welfare functions. It requires imposing more structure on the individual welfare function.
2.2 Second method: a first-order stochastic dominance condition for a
class of linear composite indices based onmultiple dichotomous vari-
ables
If we render all first-order cross-partial differences equal to zero, then we are effectively
restricting the class of admissible U to that of additively separable functions. That is:
U =
D
∑
i=1
ui(Ai), ui(1) > ui(0) (2)
Essentially U in 2 becomes a simple linear composite index. In fact, given the di-
chotomous nature of the variables, all members of U in 2 can be summarized in a class
of weighted sums, with ui(Ai) = wiAi, with wi > 0 and ∑Di=1wi = 1. We can then perform
state-wise comparisons using U in 2 in combination with the additively separable, and
population-invariant, social welfare functions from 1. Both an advantage and a challenge
of doing these comparisons is that the weights, wi, can be chosen in many different ways.
However, there is a simple, first-order dominance condition whose fulfillment guarantees
that any weighting choice produces robust comparisons (i.e. S exhibits a better autonomy
distribution than T regardless of the choice of weights). Let pi(1) ≡ Pr[Ai = 1], then the
condition is:
Condition 2. First-order stochastic dominance additive: ∆W > 0 ∀W satisfying popula-
tion principle, symmetry, and additive separability, and ∀U satisfying monotonicity and
null first-order cross-partial differences if and only if ∆pi(1) ⩾ 0 ∀i = 1,2, ...,D with at least
one strict inequality.
Proof. See Appendix. ∎
Condition 2 states that expected welfare from autonomy in S is higher than in T , for
any weighting scheme in U = ∑Di=1wiAi, if and only if the proportion of people with the best
level of autonomy in every autonomy indicator in S is never below that in B, and is strictly
above for at least one autonomy variable. Therefore, when the condition holds for a pair
of Indian states, an autonomy comparison is robust to any (potentially arbitrary) choice
of individual welfare functions. If condition 2 holds, then we say that S dominates T in
first order for additively separable individual welfare functions, denoted by S ≻11 T . Note
also that fulfillment of condition 1 implies fulfillment of 2, but the reverse is not true. We
will test condition 2 when we perform the autonomy comparisons across Indian states. For
that purpose we apply a traditional two-population, intersection-union, one-tailed z-test
for proportions.
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While this method is suitable for the type of individual welfare functions in 2, which
comprises all simple linear composite indices of the form ∑Di=1wiAi, it has some limita-
tions. Firstly, by construction, we are ruling out any strictly positive complementarity
interactions between the autonomy dimensions at the individual level. For that reason,
we effectively neglect the social joint distribution of autonomy variables; in fact the compu-
tation of W based on the individual welfare functions in 2 does not even require datasets
with information over all autonomy dimensions for the same people. The computation can
be done from separate surveys, if necessary. Secondly, this framework assumes implicitly
that a woman would be willing to give up autonomy over dimension i in favour of obtaining
autonomy over dimension j as long as wj > wi.
The third method, proposed below, restores the importance of the joint distribution of
autonomy variables among women, without the computational challenges posed by the
first method.
2.3 Third method: a first-order stochastic dominance condition com-
bined with a counting approach to autonomy measurement
We can also perform comparisons positing that women value the (weighted) number itself
of life dimensions over which they exert autonomy. In that case we can define the following
simple composite index (as in the previous section):
X =
D
∑
d=1
wdAd (3)
But now we consider an individual welfare function of the form:
U = u(X), u(i) > u(j) ∀i > j. (4)
Note the following: Firstly, U in 4 may not necessarily satisfy the property of weak
complementarity, but allows for non-zero first-order cross-partial differences. Secondly,
once we choose a set of weights, we get one specific vector of possible values for X. The
maximum number of elements of that vector is 2D, and the number of elements is D + 1
whenever wi =
1
D
∀i = 1,2, ...,D, i.e. when the weights are equal. Therefore X always
has a discrete probability distribution even though it may take values from the domain
of real numbers. If we do not want to make any particular choice for u, we can perform
an autonomy comparison based on individual welfare functions of the form in 4 by testing
a first-order stochastic dominance condition based on the cumulative discrete probability
distribution of X. We will have a different dominance condition for any given choice of
weights in 3 (unlike the second method where the condition applies directly to all possible
weights).
For our comparisons of autonomy across Indian states, we will consider the specific
case in which wi =
1
D
∀i = 1,2, ...,D. This case of equal weights implies a "pure" counting
approach to the measurement of multidimensional autonomy, whereby women are deemed
to value the total number of dimensions over which they exert autonomy per se. It also
9
assumes that a woman may accept a gain of autonomy over any dimension of life as com-
pensation for a loss of autonomy over any other dimension. This reflect the symmetry
of the individual welfare function when weights are equal. Let p(i) ≡ Pr[X = i
D
] and
F (i) ≡ Pr[X ⩽ i
D
]. Then the dominance condition is:
Condition 3. First-order stochastic dominance counting: ∆W > 0 ∀W satisfying popula-
tion principle, symmetry, and additive separability, and ∀U of the counting form in 4 with
wi =
1
D
∀i = 1,2, ...,D if and only if ∆F (i) ⩽ 0 ∀i = 0,1,2, ...,D − 1 with at least one strict
inequality.
Proof. See Appendix. ∎
For condition 3 we use the test proposed by Yalonetzky (2013). If condition 3 is fulfilled
then society S has a more appealing autonomy distribution than T , as long as the individ-
ual welfare functions belong in the class of counting measures with equal weights like 4,
i.e. S ≻cew T . Note that the individual welfare function is now more flexible regarding the
signs that its first-order cross-partial differences can take. Similar conditions can also be
derived for asymmetric cases where ∃i∣wi ≠ 1D .
3 Data
We rely on India’s National Family Survey 2005-6. Our sample contains 87588 women
aged 15 to 49 years old. Every Indian states has at least 1,000 observations. More than
90% of the households are headed by men. And we have 29 Indian states, which yields 406
pairwise comparisons. Following a long literature, we have divided the states into macro-
regions. In addition to the traditional North-South divisions we consider a separate North
Eastern region comprising the states to the East of the Siliguri corridor and Bangladesh,
including Sikkim. Our definition of the South comprises: Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka,
Andhra Pradesh, and Goa.6 All the other states are deemed Northern.
3.1 Autonomy questions
Our survey has questions on five dimensions of female autonomy: final say over day-to-
day household purchase decisions; final say over own health care decisions; final say over
large household purchase decisions; final say over visits to family or relatives decisions;
and final say over spending husband’s money decisions. For each of these questions, the
possible answer categories are: decision is made by the husband; decision is made jointly;
and decision is made (by the woman) alone. As mentioned before, it is clear that the option
"decision is made by the husband" entails limited autonomy, at least vis-a-vis the alterna-
tives. By contrast, it is harder to justify that "decision is made alone" signifies a superior
state of autonomy compared to "decision is made jointly", especially in common realms of
living in which it is reasonably expected that partners make decisions jointly (e.g. large
household purchases). Therefore, before implementing the methods, we dichotomized the
variables by merging the "joint decision" category with the "alone decision" category.
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For the reasons mentioned above, we also performed comparisons using an alterna-
tive dichotomization of the health autonomy variable, whereby "decision is made by the
husband" was combined with "decision is made jointly" into the lower autonomy category,
while "decision made alone" was left as a separate category of better autonomy. Our results
remain more or less invariant to this alternative dichotomization of the health autonomy
variable. Hence we briefly report on the results of this alternative dichotomization. 7
4 Results
We divide this section in five subsections. Subsections 1 to 3 discuss the results from
the three methods (Method 1, Method 2 and Method 3) respectively. In subsection 4, we
highlight the regional pattern of the dominance relationships using those three methods.
In subsection 5 we discuss possible driving factors behind our results.
4.1 Dominance Relationships: Method 1
We report the dominance relationships using Method 1 in this subsection. There are 261
first-order dominance relationships emerging out of the 406 comparisons; that is, about
64% of the state-wise comparisons are robust to the potentially arbitrary choice of indi-
vidual welfare functions satisfying monotonicity and weak complementarity. 230 relation-
ships are significant at 10% confidence level, of which 224 are also significant at 5%, and
208 also at 1%. In other words, less than 12% of the relationships are not significant at
10%.
Table 1 reports the proportion of all dominance relationships in which each Indian state
appears in the role of "dominating" state, followed by the proportion in which they appear
in the role of "dominated" state. It also shows the probability of being a "dominating" states
conditional on being in a dominance relationship (fifth column headed by: "(1)/[(1) + (2)]
(%)"). Note that if the prospects of appearing in a "dominating" or a "dominated" role were
completely random, then we would expect any state fulfilling either role in about 3.4%
of all dominance relationships, and the probability of being a "dominator" conditional on
being in a dominance relationship would be about 50%.
Several interesting patterns emerge. Firstly, most North Eastern states are the "dom-
inators", each in more than 8% of all comparisons, e.g., Manipur (9.2%), Mizoram (9.6%),
Nagaland (9.2%) and Sikkim (8.0%). The same cannot be inferred about the Southern
States with the exception of Tamil Nadu (6.1%), Maharashtra (4.9%) and Goa (4.2%). By
contrast, the southern state of Kerala, with a high Human Development Index (HDI), acts
as a "dominator" only in 1.9% cases. The situation with most of the Northern states is
even worse; they rarely appear as "dominators" at all, with the exception of Delhi (6.1%)
and Jharkhand (3.4%), a newly formed state in the year 2000 mainly due to the tribal de-
mands. Meanwhile, Northern states, like Jammu and Kashmir (9.2%), Rajasthan (8.4%),
West Bengal (7.7%), Bihar and Uttaranchal (both at 6.1%) are the "dominated" in rela-
tively high proportions of all dominance relationships.
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Secondly, the probability of being a "dominator" conditional on being in a dominance re-
lationship is 100% for four North Eastern states: Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, and Na-
galand; and more than 85% in two other states: Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim. Amongst
the Southern states, only Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu, show a conditional probability
of being "dominator" higher than 70%. Almost all the Northern states, except Delhi and
Jharkhand, show the reverse: the conditional probability of being "dominated" is higher
than 50%. Thirdly, there are some interesting exceptions. Tripura is always dominated
in its dominance relationships despite being a North Eastern State; similarly Karnataka
is dominated in 95% of its dominance relationships despite being in the South. Three
Northern states, Jammu and Kashmir, Rajasthan and West Bengal are always dominated.
Table 1: State roles in dominance relationships: Method 1
State Region % Dominating (1) % Dominated (2) (1)/[(1) + (2)] (%)
Andhra P South 0.766 4.215 15.385
Arunachal P North East 6.130 0.383 94.118
Assam North East 5.747 1.533 78.947
Bihar North 0.766 6.130 11.111
Chattisgarh North 0.383 3.831 9.091
Delhi North 6.130 1.533 80.000
Goa South 4.215 1.916 68.750
Gujarat North 2.299 4.215 35.294
Haryana North 2.682 3.065 46.667
Himachal P North 2.682 2.682 50.000
Jammu and K North 0.000 9.195 0.000
Jharkand North 3.448 3.065 52.941
Karnataka South 0.383 7.280 5.000
Kerala South 1.916 2.299 45.455
Madhya P North 0.766 4.981 13.333
Maharashtra South 4.981 1.916 72.222
Manipur North East 9.195 0.000 100.000
Meghalaya North East 7.663 0.000 100.000
Mizoram North East 9.579 0.000 100.000
Nagaland North East 9.195 0.000 100.000
Orissa North 2.682 4.215 38.889
Punjab North 1.149 2.299 33.333
Rajasthan North 0.000 8.429 0.000
Sikkim North East 8.046 1.149 87.500
Tamil Nadu South 6.130 1.533 80.000
Tripura North East 0.000 6.513 0.000
Uttaranchal North 1.149 6.130 15.789
Uttar P North 1.916 3.831 33.333
West Bengal North 0.000 7.663 0.000
4.2 Dominance Relationships: Method 2
Table 2 reports the results using Method 2. In this case, there are 330 first-order dom-
inance relationships emerging out of the 406 comparisons. This means that about 81%
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of the state-wise comparisons of the linear composite autonomy indices are robust to the
potentially arbitrary choice of weights. This higher proportion of dominance relationships,
vis-a-vis method 1, is to be expected since condition 2 is less stringent to meet than con-
dition 1. 278 relationships are significant at 10% confidence level, of which 264 are also
significant at 5%, and 243 also at 1%. In other words, less than 16% of the relationships
are not significant at 10%.
Roughly the same pattern emerges as in Table 1 with the following exceptions. For
Kerala, a state located in the South, the probability of being a "dominator" conditional on
being in a dominance relationship increases from 45.5% to 71.1%. More Northern states
are the "dominator" in relatively high proportions of all dominance relationships, e.g. Delhi
(75%), Harayana (52.6%), Himachal Pradesh (50%) and Uttar Pradesh (50%). By contrast,
the conditional probability of being a "dominator" decresaes for Jharkhand from 52.9% to
45% when we use Method 2 compared to Method 1.
Table 2: State roles in dominance relationships: Method 2
State Region % Dominating (1) % Dominated (2) (1)/[(1) + (2)] (%)
Andhra P South 3.030 4.242 41.667
Arunachal P North East 4.848 1.515 76.190
Assam North East 6.667 1.515 81.481
Bihar North 1.212 6.061 16.667
Chattisgarh North 0.303 6.364 4.545
Delhi North 5.455 1.818 75.000
Goa South 3.939 2.121 65.000
Gujarat North 2.424 5.152 32.000
Haryana North 3.030 2.727 52.632
Himachal P North 3.333 3.333 50.000
Jammu and K North 0.000 7.576 0.000
Jharkand North 2.727 3.333 45.000
Karnataka South 0.303 6.667 4.348
Kerala South 4.545 1.818 71.429
Madhya P North 1.515 5.455 21.739
Maharashtra South 4.545 2.424 65.217
Manipur North East 7.576 0.303 96.154
Meghalaya North East 7.576 0.000 100.000
Mizoram North East 7.576 0.000 100.000
Nagaland North East 7.879 0.000 100.000
Orissa North 3.030 3.636 45.455
Punjab North 0.909 1.818 33.333
Rajasthan North 0.000 7.576 0.000
Sikkim North East 7.273 1.212 85.714
Tamil Nadu South 5.152 2.121 70.833
Tripura North East 0.303 6.061 4.762
Uttaranchal North 1.212 5.758 17.391
Uttar P North 3.333 3.333 50.000
West Bengal North 0.303 6.061 4.762
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4.3 Dominance Relationships: Method 3
Table 3 reports our findings. 377 first-order dominance relationships emerge out of the
406. This means that almost 93% of the state-wise comparisons of multidimensional au-
tonomy are robust to different individual welfare functions evaluating the autonomy score
constructed following 3. 319 relationships are significant at 10% confidence level, of which
297 are also significant at 5%, and 274 also at 1%. In other words, less than 16% of the
relationships are not significant at 10%.
The results more or less corroborate the same pattern in Table 1 and in Table 1 with
the following exceptions. For the North Eastern state of Assam, the probability of being
a "dominator" conditional on being in a dominance relationship has decreased from 78.9%
(Method 1) and 81.5% (Method 2) to 58.3%. The same pattern is observed for Meghalaya,
another North Eastern State (a decrease from 100% in the previous two methods to 76.2%).
For Punjab, a state located in the North, this conditional probability of being a "dominator"
increased from 33.3% (in both Methods 1 and 2) to 60%.
Table 3: State roles in dominance relationships: Method 3
State Region % Dominating (1) % Dominated (2) (1)/[(1) + (2)] (%)
Andhra P South 1.326 5.570 19.231
Arunachal P North East 6.631 0.531 92.593
Assam North East 3.714 2.653 58.333
Bihar North 0.796 6.101 11.538
Chattisgarh North 2.918 3.979 42.308
Delhi North 5.305 1.857 74.074
Goa South 5.836 1.326 81.481
Gujarat North 2.918 3.714 44.000
Haryana North 3.183 3.448 48.000
Himachal P North 3.979 2.122 65.217
Jammu and K North 0.000 7.162 0.000
Jharkand North 2.918 3.714 44.000
Karnataka South 0.531 6.897 7.143
Kerala South 4.244 2.122 66.667
Madhya P North 2.122 5.305 28.571
Maharashtra South 4.509 2.122 68.000
Manipur North East 6.631 0.531 92.593
Meghalaya North East 4.244 1.326 76.190
Mizoram North East 7.162 0.000 100.000
Nagaland North East 7.162 0.000 100.000
Orissa North 2.387 4.775 33.333
Punjab North 3.979 2.653 60.000
Rajasthan North 0.000 7.162 0.000
Sikkim North East 6.366 1.061 85.714
Tamil Nadu South 5.570 1.592 77.778
Tripura North East 1.326 5.570 19.231
Uttaranchal North 1.061 5.570 16.000
Uttar P North 2.387 4.775 33.333
West Bengal North 0.796 6.366 11.111
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4.4 Regional Pattern in the dominance relationships
Table 4 classifies the dominance relationships by the region of the involved states. If the
region appears on the rows it means that the dominating states belong in it, whereas if a
region appears on the column it means that dominated states belong in it. For instance,
for Method 1, the bottom middle cell indicates that 38.7% of all dominance relationships
involve a North Eastern state dominating a Northern state. Similarly, for Method 2 and
Method 3, the figures stand at 33.03% and 28.38% for the same category.
The rightmost column ("Total rows") aggregates the columns across and yields the dis-
tribution of dominance relationships by regional origin of the dominating state. Clearly,
the majority of dominating states are either North Eastern or Northern. However, in
most relationships where Northern states dominate, the dominated states are also from
the North (24.53/31.03 = 79.05% for Method 1, 25.76/33.33 = 77.29% for Method 2 and
28.91/39.26 = 73.64% for Method 3). The proportion of domination over states from the same
region is much smaller for North Eastern states (5.75/55.76 = 10.35%, 6.67/49.70 = 13.42%
and 6.90/43.24 = 15.96% for Methods 1, 2, and 3 respectively). The proportion of domina-
tion over states from the same region is also smaller for the Southern states (1.92/13.41 =
14.32%, 2.12/16.97 = 12.49% and 2.65/17.51 = 15.13% for methods 1, 2, and 3, respectively),
in fact almost similar to that of North Eastern states.
The bottom row ("total columns") aggregates the rows across and yields the distribution
of dominance relationships by regional origin of the dominated state. Most dominated
states come from the North (always higher than 70.0%), and only 33.5%, 35.5% and 40.8%
(by using methods 1, 2, and 3, respectively) of them are dominated by other Northern
states.
Table 4 also tells us that among the relationships involving a Southern versus a North-
ern state, Southern states dominate in about 70% of them taking the average of the dom-
inance relationships using the three methods (70.3%, 73.8%, and 66.2%, for methods 1, 2,
and 3 respectively). Similarly, in comparisons involving a North Eastern versus a North-
ern state, North Eastern states dominate in 92.0% of cases on average; with the highest
proportion of domination occurring for Method 1 at 94.3% of cases (38.7/(38.7 + 2.3)); fol-
lowed by method 2 at 92.4%, and method 3 at 89.2%. Finally, in comparisons involving a
North Eastern versus a Southern State, North Eastern states dominate in 87.6% of cases
on average with lowest dominance occurring with Method 3 (7.96/(7.96 + 1.33) = 85.7%),
followed by method 1 (87.9%) and method 2 (89.2%).
In summary, Table 4 shows the high prevalence of dominance relationships in which
either a North Eastern or a Southern state dominate a Northern state; but also the
supremacy of North Eastern states when compared against states from any other region.
Now, how do the apparent outlier states affect results reported in Table 4? According to
Tables 1, 2 and 3, we observe that Tripura is dominated on average in 6.05% of all relation-
ships using the three methods (6.513 in Method 1, 6.061 in Method 2 and 5.57 in Method
3), whereas North Eastern states are dominated in 10.62% of all relationships (Table 4,
taking the average of all the bottom rows). This means that Tripura alone explains more
than half (56.94%) of all situations in which North Eastern states turn up dominated.
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Table 4: Dominance relationships by Macro-region (%)
Method 1
≻1 Southern ≻1 Northern ≻1 North Eastern Total
state state state Rows
Southern state ≻1 1.92 9.96 1.53 13.41
Northern state ≻1 4.21 24.52 2.30 31.03
North Eastern state ≻1 11.11 38.70 5.75 55.56
Total Columns 17.24 73.18 9.58 100
Method 2
≻11 Southern ≻11 Northern ≻11 North Eastern Total
state state state Rows
Southern state ≻11 2.12 13.64 1.21 16.97
Northern state ≻11 4.85 25.76 2.73 33.33
North Eastern state ≻11 10.00 33.03 6.67 49.70
Total Columns 16.97 72.42 10.61 100
Method 3
≻cew Southern ≻cew Northern ≻cew North Eastern Total
state state state Rows
Southern state ≻cew 2.65 13.52 1.33 17.51
Northern state ≻cew 6.90 28.91 3.45 39.26
North Eastern state ≻cew 7.96 28.38 6.90 43.24
Total Columns 17.51 70.82 11.67 100
Similarly, Karnataka is dominated in 6.95% of all relationships on an average, whereas
Southern states are dominated in 17.24% on average of all cases. Therefore Karnataka
alone generates about 40% of situations in which Southern states end up dominated. In
the Northern region, Jammu and Kashmir, Rajasthan and West Bengal stand out for their
high propensity to be dominated states conditional on being in a dominance relationship.
How do results reported in Table 4 change if we apply the alternative dichotomization
for the health autonomy variable? Firstly, the number of dominance relationships does
not change at all for methods 1 and 2. Meanwhile, with method 3 we find 10 additional
dominance relationships, i.e. 387 in total, vis-a-vis the previous dichotomization. Again,
large proportions of the dominance relationships are statistically significant at 10% and
lower levels.
Secondly, the pattern of dominance by North Eastern states over Northern states de-
creases, but it still significantly large (89.7%, 85.5%, and 89.4%, for methods 1, 2, and 3,
respectively). The pattern of dominance of Southern states over Northern states also de-
creases mildly (63.6%, 65.2%, and 66.7%, for methods 1, 2, and 3, respectively). We reach
a similar conclusion for comparisons of North Eastern against Southern states. The rate
of domination decreases only slightly (84.1%, 83.3%, and 83.8%, for methods 1, 2, and 3
respectively).
Thirdly, each likelihood of appearing in dominance relationships as "dominator", and as
"dominated", remains fairly stable for all states when we change the health dichotomiza-
tion. These relative frequencies increase or decrease for some states, but never departing
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significantly from the original values. Sometimes the effect of the alternative dichotomiza-
tion on these ratios depends on the method used. For example, with the new dichotomiza-
tion, Jammu and Kashmir appear as "dominated" about 8%, 13%, and 7.2% of the times
(for methods 1, 2, and 3, respectively), which means that the alternative dichotomization
improves the stand of Jammu and Kashmir according to method 1, but not according to
the other two methods.8
In conclusion, it seems that the alternative dichotomization, placing higher importance
on "lone decision" in health autonomy, mainly decreases the intensity of the patterns of
regional domination, without substantially blurring or overturning them.
4.5 Discussion
Here we briefly discuss some potential correlates of the regional patterns of dominance
relationships. On a first glance, the impact of sanskritization and some measures of eco-
nomic development associate well with the distribution of "dominator" and "dominated"
roles across states and regions. For instance, most of the Northern states, with the ex-
ceptions of Delhi and (to some extent) Himachal Pradesh, are dominated by states located
either in the North East or the South. According to the Reserve Bank of India, Annual
Report in 2013, in 2011−12, the percentage of people living below the poverty line, based
on mixed reference period consumption, was 9.91% in Delhi, compared to 21.92% in India
as a whole. The poverty rates in all the surrounding Northern states is higher, except for
Punjab and Himachal Pradesh. Similarly, the literacy rate in Delhi is higher than the
national average (81.7% in 2001 compared to the national average of 64.8%). The other
Northern state with a comparable literacy rate is Himachal Pradesh (76.5%) according to
the Indian Census 2001.9
The dominance of North Eastern states could plausibly be associated to the presence
of tribal populations and the importance of Christianity, especially in states like Manipur,
Meghalaya, Nagaland, and Mizoram. Hence the impact of sanskritisation would be mini-
mal. Possibly, the better performance of Jharkhand out of the three newly formed states
in India by the time of the survey (Chattisgarh and Uttaranchal being the other two) could
also be related to the strong presence of a tribal population (26.3% of the total population
as per 2001 census). 10 In fact, the state was formed primarily due to the demand of tribal
movements, mainly the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM), which allied tribal grievances
to more general objections to north Bihari domination (Chandra et al., 2008, pp. 148-151).
However, the presence of a politically active and/or demographically significant tribal pop-
ulation may not necessarily correlate with a good performance in state-wise autonomy
comparisons. For example, Chattisgarh did not perform well, notwithstanding its sizeable
tribal population (31.8% according to the Indian Census 2001). Moreover, Chattisgarh
is not known for a relatively high prevalence of some obvious markers of female seclu-
sion (e.g. purdah/ghoonghat wearing) or low social status (e.g. dowry payments) (UNDP,
2005, p. 76). This case exemplifies that the task of associating socioeconomic and cul-
tural indicators to the observed state-wide patterns of female autonomy is anything but
straightforward.
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The dismal performance of West Bengal could be attributed to the lower economic em-
powerment of women, especially in rural areas, as otherwise they enjoy higher political
empowerment than several other states in India. The indices of ‘power over economic
resources’ and of ‘economic participation and decision-making power’ for West Bengal in
2006 stand at 0.202 and 0.426, respectively, compared to the national averages of 0.319
and 0.546 (Ministry of Women and Child Development, 2009). This has ensued from the
lower worker-population ratio, higher involvement of female workers in marginal activi-
ties compared to their male counterparts, higher growth of real wages for male agricultural
workers, and widening female-male wage gap. Thus, West Bengal provides a good exam-
ple of the imperfect correlation of female autonomy (or empowerment) indicators across
different realms of life (Malhotra and Schuler, 2005).
5 Conclusion
A fairly robust pattern of regional domination emerges from the three methods (and two
alternative dichotomizations for health autonomy) implemented. North Eastern states are
more likely to dominate states from other Indian regions whenever a dominance relation-
ship exists. This means that the multivariate distributions of female autonomy in North
Eastern states are generally more desirable than their counterpart distributions in other
parts of India, for several classes of individual welfare evaluation criteria. Likewise in
dominance relationships involving Southern versus Northern states, the former are more
likely to appear dominating the latter.
As mentioned, regional domination patterns do not change much by method used (even
by alternative dichotomization of the health autonomy indicator); but, interestingly, intra-
regional variations matter. For instance, Tripura appear as dominated in the majority
of dominance relationships in which it participates; despite hailing from the North-East
where most other states almost always turn up as "dominators". Something similar occurs
to Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka, both Southern states who never appear as "domina-
tors" in more than 50% of their dominance relationships; by contrast to other Southern
states like Kerala, Goa and Tamil Nadu, which generally dominate in their respective
dominance relationships. 11 In a different way, both Delhi and Himachal Pradesh repre-
sent exceptions to the northern-state pattern. These states actually appear as "domina-
tors" in at least 50% of their dominance relationships. Delhi in particular dominates more
than 70% of the time. Hence differences between states within the same region do matter.
At this stage it is worth mentioning some methodological and conceptual limitations,
which would be common to like-minded studies. Methodologically, while the fulfillment
of dominance conditions guarantees the robustness of a comparison to several alternative
choices among broad classes of welfare evaluation functions, they remain silent as to any
cardinality of the comparison. For that purpose one needs to choose specific evaluation
functions. Likewise, when a dominance condition cannot be established, any pairwise
comparison must invariably rely on a choice of autonomy index. Since the dominance
condition is not met in this case, the rank established by the comparison will inevitably
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depend on the choice of index.
Conceptually, some caveats need to be taken into account, in general, when working on
female autonomy with survey-based indicators (e.g. see chapters in Narayan, 2005, for a
discussion). For instance, it would be harder to ascertain that a woman who decides alone
on a realm of life bears real autonomy over it, if that dimension is actually worthless to
her husband. 12 Hence the importance of social norms in defining the realms of female
autonomy. Some researchers claim that, when widely accepted norms uphold the right and
power of women to make decisions over a specific dimension, there is no real individual
autonomy to speak of (Malhotra and Schuler, 2005). We may not go as far as to dismiss di-
mensions where widespread female autonomy is enforced by social norms. If anything we
would deem the lack of individual autonomy in such settings perhaps even more serious.
Meanwhile, contrasting this view on social norms and drawing from the (Sen-Nussbaum)
capability approach, we do advocate studying the extent of female autonomy over realms
of life which both women and men have reason to value.
Finally, we would like to point out a few more avenues of future research. Firstly,
other welfare evaluation methods can be considered in addition to the three proposed.
Secondly, in between traditional dominance tools and measurement based on composite
indices, there is available an intermediate path of using dominance-intensity conditions
whose fulfillment guarantees that the social welfare difference between countries A and
B is stronger than between E and F for a broad class of welfare functions. These tech-
niques might provide further interesting insights. Thirdly, future research should attempt
a conditioning strategy, perhaps coupled with dominance comparisons, in order to inquiry
further and deeper into the causes of state and regional variations in the multivariate
distributions of female autonomy in India, without losing sight of those states that may
constitute an "exception to the rule" vis-a-vis their surrounding regions. Fourthly, just
as we found important state exceptions to regional patterns, it would be worth studying
provincial comparisons within states. The latter is warranted both by the large popula-
tions of most Indian states by global standards, and by reports pointing to actual provin-
cial differences in perceptions of women’s status within some Indian states (e.g. the case
of Chattisgarh, UNDP, 2005).
6 Appendix (FOR ONLINE ACCESS ONLY )
All the proofs in this section are either extensions or direct applications of Hadar and
Russell (1969, Theorem 1).
6.1 Proof of condition 1
First, we construct ∆W using the general form in 1, but considering only U satisfying
weak complementarity. Then we sum ∆W by parts (using "Abel’s formula") in order to
render the right-hand side of ∆W as the sum of products of first-order cross-partial differ-
ences multiplied by joint survival distributions. We get the result derived by Yalonetzky
(2013, equation 20, p. 143), in which clearly ∆W > 0 for all U characterized by weak com-
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plementarity if and only if all the joint survival probabilities of S are never below those
of T , and at least once strictly above. Now note that, by definition of survival functions,
if ∆F (i1, i2, ..., iD) ⩾ 0 ∀i1, i2, ..., iD = 0,1 (with at least one strict inequality), then all the
other joint survival functions of lower order (i.e. involving fewer than the total of D vari-
ables, including the marginal survival distributions) will also have to be non-negative.
Therefore ∆F (i1, i2, ..., iD) ⩾ 0 ∀i1, i2, ..., iD = 0,1 (with at least one strict inequality) is a
sufficient condition for ∆W > 0. It is also a necessary condition, because otherwise we
could find some U function fulfilling monotonicity and weak complementarity such that
∆W < 0.
6.2 Proof of condition 2
Again, we construct ∆W , but now using the U in 2. Note that for W we get:
W =
1
N
N
∑
n=1
D
∑
i=1
ui(Ai) =
1
∑
j=0
D
∑
i=1
ui(j)pi(j) (5)
Then we sum ∆W by parts (using "Abel’s formula") and we get:
∆W =
D
∑
i=1
[ui(1) − ui(0)]∆pi(1) (6)
Given that [ui(1) − ui(0)] > 0 ∀i = 1,2, ...,D due to satisfaction of monotonicity, then
∆W > 0 if and only if ∆pi(1) ⩾ 0 ∀i = 1,2, ...,D with at least one strict inequality.
6.3 Proof of condition 3
Now we construct ∆W using U in 4 with wi =
1
D
∀i. Note that for W we get:
W =
1
N
N
∑
n=1
U(X) =
D
∑
i=0
U(i)p(i) (7)
Then we sum ∆W by parts (using "Abel’s formula") and we get:
∆W = −
D
∑
i=0
[U(
i + 1
D
) −U(
i
D
)]∆F (i) (8)
From 8 we can deduce that ∆W > 0 if and only if ∆F (i) ⩽ 0 ∀i = 0,1,2, ...,D − 1 with at
least one strict inequality.
7 Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank two anonymous referees, Paola Ballon, Sabina Alkire,
Suman Seth, participants at the conference of the Society for Economic Measurement,
Paris, July 2015, and seminar participants at OPHI Seminar Series, November 28th 2013,
and at the Leeds Economics Seminar series, February , 2014; for very helpful and con-
structive comments. We would also like to thank Melissa Friedman for very valuable and
efficient research assistance.
20
Notes
1We would like to thank an anonymous referee for emphasizing the importance of ‘sanskritisation’ in this
literature.
2There is an old literature investigating the possible original causes behind the low autonomy of women
among Hindu societies in India, vis-a-vis other southern and eastern Asian peoples. For instance, Boserup
(2011) relates it to the degree of female participation (or lack thereof) in the different modes of agricultural
production across the regions.
3By first-order cross-partial difference we mean the non-continuous equivalent of first-order cross-partial
derivatives. For example with D = 2, the first-order cross-partial difference would be: [U(1,1) − U(1,0)] −
[U(0,1) −U(0,0)].
4Alternative dominance conditions can also be applied if we allow for welfare functions not fulfilling the
property of weak complementarity. However, there are not enough conditions for all possible combinations
of first-order cross-partial differences, and the interpretations of their different possible signs becomes quite
challenging, unlike condition 1. For a discussion see Yalonetzky (2013).
5Since the first survival probability is equal to 1.
6Telangana, formed in 2014, was still part of Andhra Pradesh when the survey was carried out.
7We would like to thank an anonymous referee for suggesting the alternative dichotomization.
8Detailed results are available from the authors upon request.
9See censusindia.gov.in/Tables_Published/A-Series/A-Series_links/t_00_006.aspx.
10See censusindia.gov.in/Tables_Published/A-Series/pca_main.html
11Although Kerala dominates in less than 50% of its relationships according to method 1.
12We would like to thank Melissa Friedman for pointing out this issue.
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